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Locating Discrimination: Interactive Web
Sites as Public Accommodations under
Title II of the Civil Rights Act
Tara E. Thompson'
One of the advantages to communicating via the internet is
inherent anonymity-the opportunity to express opinions with-
out the same consequences that result from face-to-face encoun-
ters. Unfortunately, this anonymity leads some people to use web
sites, specifically those that host chat rooms and bulletin boards,
as outlets for racist, offensive, or hateful opinions.' Individual
forum users have limited recourse against such behavior other
than reporting misbehavior to site managers.2 Some interactive
web site operators ("site operators"), entities that host internet
bulletin boards, chat rooms, and other interactive web sites ("in-
teractive sites"),3 elect to monitor the forums they host by posting
B.A. 2000, University of Utah; J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Chicago.
1 Estimates for the number of "hate sites"-web sites specifically devoted to hateful
speech-that exist vary widely from 400 to over 1,200. See Lakshmi Chaudhry, Hate Sites
Bad Recruiting Tools, Wired (May 23, 2000), available online at
<http://www.wired.com/newslculture/0,1284,36478,00.html> (visited Nov 15, 2002) [on file
with U Chi Legal F]. In addition to hosting sites specifically devoted to hate speech, per-
sons with hateful messages can interrupt otherwise benign speech in chat rooms and
bulletin boards. See, for example, Class Action Complaint for Discrimination in Public
Accommodation and Breach of Contract, Noah v AOL Time Warner, Inc, Civil Action No.
01-1342-A (E D Va filed Aug 30, 2001) ("Noah Class Action Complaint) (initiating a law-
suit alleging that forum participants made anti-Islamic statements in an America Online
chat room devoted to Islam).
' See, for example, Yahoo's form for reporting misbehavior, available online at
<http:/add.yahoo.com/fast/help/mesg/cgi-abuse> (visited Nov 15, 2002) [on file with U Chi
Legal F].
3 Applying the right terminology to describe these types of web sites and their opera-
tors is difficult, but this Comment will use "web site operators" rather than other more
commonly used terms like Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") or Internet Content Provid-
ers ("ICPs"). See Michael D. Scott, Internet and Technology Law Desk Reference 329 (As-
pen 2001) (compiling internet definitions used in court opinions and defining ISPs as
"typically offer[ing] modem telephone access to a computer or computer network linked to
the internet"). Scott also defines ICPs as "individuals or organizations that have estab-
lished a presence, or 'site' on the Web by publishing a collection of Web pages." Id at 327.
ICPs and ISPs, while potentially encompassing interactive web sites and their operators,
both have a broader meaning and are therefore inappropriate when more precise termi-
nology is available.
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rules and checking for compliance.4 They also remove prohibited
content and punish those users who post such material by issuing
warnings or denying them future access to interactive site fo-
6
rums.
Forum monitoring obviously benefits customers who do not
want to encounter such conduct, but site operators may also have
legal reasons for regulating user behavior. In August 2001, Mr.
Saad Noah filed a putative class action lawsuit against his site
operator, America Online ("AOL"), for failing to remove discrimi-
natory postings from an AOL chat room or punish the users who
posted them.6 Noah alleged that AOL monitored and held ac-
countable users who made discriminatory remarks against non-
Muslim religious groups, but failed to prevent or punish anti-
Muslim remarks even after Noah repeatedly documented and
reported such activity.7 Noah argued that AOL's actions consti-
tuted discrimination in a place of public accommodation, a viola-
tion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 8
If Noah's lawsuit succeeds, AOL and other site operators
could face a legal responsibility to prevent discrimination in their
chat rooms and on their bulletin boards. Under Title II of the
Civil Rights Act ("Title II"), all persons are entitled to "the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodation of any place of public accommo-
dation." Broadly defined, public accommodations are entities that
are privately owned and operated but hold themselves out as pro-
viding service to the public."° Courts have yet to determine how,
or if, laws regulating public accommodations apply to the inter-
4 See, for example, AOL Rules of User Conduct, available online at
<http://www.aol.com/copyright/rules.html> (visited Nov 15, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal
F] (providing that "America Online and its agents have the right at their sole discretion to
remove any content that, in America Online's judgment, does not comply with the Rules of
User Conduct or is otherwise harmful, objectionable, or inaccurate").
' See id. See also America Online's Terms and Conditions of Use, available online at
<http'//www.aol.com/copyright.html> (visited Nov 15, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F]
("America Online reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to terminate your access to all
or part of this site, with or without notice.").
6 See Noah Class Action Complaint at *1 (cited in note 1).
See id at *26.
8 See id, citing 42 USC § 2000a (2000).
42 USC § 2000a(a).10 Providing a precise definition of a "public accommodation" is difficult; neither stat-
utes nor case law provide a concise definition, and what constitutes a public accommoda-
tion is at issue in this Comment. Therefore, as a point of reference, a general definition
must suffice.
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net. Consequently, if the internet can be a public accommodation,
the regulatory power of Title II would expand significantly.
This Comment argues that internet chat rooms and bulletin
boards are public accommodations under Title II. Part I analyzes
a threshold question, whether Title II's definition of public ac-
commodations can include "non-physical" entities like organiza-
tions. Part II examines the circuit split on the question of insur-
ance offerings as public accommodations under the analogous
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and ana-
lyzes this split's applicability to the Title II context. Part III ex-
plores the purposes of Title II and argues that characterizing the
internet as a public accommodation is consistent with those pur-
poses. Part IV examines the internet itself and how the law
should classify interactive sites-as places, as membership or-
ganizations with ties to a physical location, or as something else.
Finally, Part V considers both how courts would apply the Civil
Rights Act to interactive sites and the consequences of such an
application.
I. REGULATION OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER TITLE II
This Part of the Comment explains how Title II regulates
public accommodations. Section A gives an overview of Title II
itself. Section B addresses a basic question that the language of
the statute leaves unanswered: whether membership organiza-
tions are public accommodations under Title II. Case law on
membership organizations leaves open the question of whether
interactive sites can be Title II public accommodations.
A. "Public Accommodations" Defined in Title II
To determine whether Title II extends to interactive sites,
one must first examine the language of the statute. Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoy-
ment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, and accommodations of any place of public accom-
modation, as defined in this section, without discrimina-
tion or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or
national origin."
11 42 USC § 2000a(a).
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In short, Title II prohibits discrimination, meaning the denial of
full enjoyment, based on one's "race, color, religion, or national
origin," of places that the Civil Rights Act defines as "public ac-
commodations." 2
The Civil Rights Act defines public accommodations by pro-
viding a list of "establishments" that are public accommodations
under the Act so long as their "operations affect commerce."3 Title
II divides these establishments into three principal categories:
inns and motels; 4 restaurants and lunch counters; and a third
entertainment category that includes "any motion picture house,
theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhi-
bition or entertainment."" Internet bulletin boards and chat rooms
fall, if anywhere, under this third "entertainment" category.
Aside from this category's broad language, Title II leaves little
room for anything but the specific places it lists as public accom-
modations."
B. Membership Organizations under Title II
To decide whether internet forums qualify as "other place[s]
of exhibition or entertainment," it is useful first to examine how
broadly courts have interpreted the language of Title II. On its
face, Title II only provides for public accommodations that are
traditional "physical" locations, accommodations located in build-
ings and other traditional spaces. The courts, however, have not
reached a consensus as to under what circumstances "non-
physical" establishments can be Title II public accommodations.
12 See id.
13 42 USC § 2000a(b). The statute begins: "Each of the following establishments which
serves the public is a place of public accommodation . . . ." Id. Technically this language
leaves room for the inclusion of other public accommodations, but no court has found an
entity to be a public accommodation without placing it in one of the three statutory cate-
gories.
14 42 USC § 2000a(b)(1).
Is 42 USC § 2000a(b)(2).
16 42 USC § 2000a(b)(3) (emphasis added).
17 A canon of statutory construction also suggests this result. The maxim expressio
unius states that courts should interpret statutes so that including one thing implies the
exclusion of its alternative. See William N. Eskridge, Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth
Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy
819, 824 (West 3d ed 2001) (discussing various statutory canons). The first two categories
in Title II list only specific public accommodations, but the final category includes broad
language. The fact that the first two categories could have been similarly broad, but are
not, suggests that they are narrower than the third. See id. This canon is only of limited
usefulness, however, since courts ignore it when it leads to undesired results. See id.
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While there is no clear precedent addressing internet forums,
courts have considered the analogous question of whether mem-
bership organizations like the Boy Scouts of America ("Boy
Scouts") constitute public accommodations under Title I.18 While
they may operate public accommodations," membership organiza-
tions are not themselves physical locations. Based on this distinc-
tion, the Boy Scout decisions effectively preclude courts from ap-
plying Title II to non-physical entities like membership organiza-
tions unless those organizations have a connection to a specific
physical location."° While this analysis appears to suggest that
Title II does not apply to interactive sites, the courts' failure to
define "physical location" still leaves the door open for Title II
interactive site regulation.
1. The "Boy Scouts" cases.
The Boy Scouts have faced several recent lawsuits that un-
successfully attempted to use Title II to challenge its membership
requirements." These claims failed because courts did not view
the Boy Scouts as (1) a public organization, or (2) a physical facil-
ity.
22
In Welsh v Boy Scouts of America,2 Mark Welsh brought a
Title II discrimination claim against the Boy Scouts after the or-
ganization denied him membership because he refused to recite
the Boy Scout oath.2'4 The Seventh Circuit examined Title II's list
of public accommodations and determined that the statute did
not apply to the Boy Scouts.2 This opinion deserves particularly
'8 See, for example, Welsh v Boy Scouts of America, 993 F2d 1267, 1269 (7th Cir 1993)
(holding that the Boy Scouts of America is not a public accommodation under Title II).
19 A paradigmatic example would be a Boy Scout camp.
20 Courts have found that YMCA gyms are public accommodations. See, for example,
Smith v YMCA of Montgomery, 462 F2d 634, 636 (5th Cir 1972) (holding that the YMCA's
racially discriminatory practices violated African Americans' constitutional and statutory
rights). For a more detailed explanation of membership organizations under Title II, see
Part I B 1 (discussing the Boy Scouts decisions).
" See, for example, Welsh v Boy Scouts of America, 993 F2d 1267 (7th Cir 1993); Boy
Scouts of America v Dale, 530 US 640 (2000) (holding that the application of New Jersey's
public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to readmit a troop leader fired for
disclosing his homosexuality violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment rights).
22 See Welsh, 993 F2d at 1269.
23 993 F2d 1267 (7th Cir 1993).
24 See id at 1268. Welsh refused to recite the oath because it requires scouts to state a
belief in God, and he argued that excluding him from the organization on this basis consti-
tuted discrimination on the basis of religion. See id.
2' See id at 1269 (holding that the Boy Scouts was not "[anlother place of exhibition or
entertainment" under § 2000a(b)(3)).
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close attention because of the court's analysis of the language of
Title II and the inferences the court draws from that language
concerning Congress's intent in passing Title II.
The Welsh opinion addressed two separate issues: whether
the Boy Scouts could be a place of public accommodation under
the Act, and whether the Boy Scouts were a public or a private
26
organization. Interpreting the plain meaning of the statute, the
court first addressed the issue of how Title II defines public ac-
commodations." After reviewing the list of entities defined as
public accommodations in Title II, the Seventh Circuit found that
all of them were physical facilities and none even resembled
membership organizations.' All of these observations served as
evidence to the court that the enacting Congress did not intend
Title II to regulate membership organizations that do not "main-
tain a close connection to a structural facility. ... ."
The court then reviewed earlier decisions that found mem-
bership organizations to be public accommodations, and distin-
guished them on the ground that in each case the organizations
operated a physical facility or a structure.3 The organizations in
these cases operated a swimming pool;"1 a YMCA gymnasium;32 a
hunting and fishing preserve;33 a youth football field with bleach-
ers and a concession stand;' a public golf course;" and a teachers'
organization that held meetings at a public school.36 These earlier
26 See Welsh, 993 F2d at 1269. The court found that the Boy Scouts was a private,
rather than a public organization, and for this reason alone did not qualify as a public
accommodation. See id at 1276-77. Despite this finding, the bulk of the opinion neverthe-
less focused on the other issue, whether the Boy Scouts is an "accommodation" under Title
II.
I See id at 1269.
28 Id. For the Welsh court, if Congress had meant to include membership organiza-
tions in the all-inclusive category they would have worded it instead as "or other public
exhibition or entertainment." Welsh, 993 F2d at 1272.
' Id at 1269.
30 See id at 1272-74.
31 United States v Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F Supp 785, 790 (E D Pa 1989).
32 Smith v YMCA of Montgomery, 462 F2d 634, 636 (5th Cir 1972).Durham v Red Lake Fishing & Hunting Club, Inc, 666 F Supp 954, 959 (W D Tex
1987).
31 United States v Slidell Youth Football Association, 387 F Supp 474 (E D La 1974).
Wesley v City of Savannah, 294 F Supp 698, 701-02 (S D Ga 1969).
3" Auerbach v African American Teachers Association, 356 F Supp 1046, 1948 (E D
NY 1973). Aside from this case, what each of these courts could have said, to make their
position clearer, was that the specific public facilities run by membership organizations
are public accommodations, and the membership organizations, as owners or lessors, are
responsible for discrimination in their facilities. Still, this interpretation does not explain
the cases where a membership organization merely held meetings in a public facility. The
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cases confirmed the Welsh court's conclusion because each of
these organizations used public facilities or operated facilities
open to the public.
Although the Welsh court unequivocally held that member-
ship organizations, absent a close connection to a physical facility
or location, are not public accommodations, it failed to define
clearly "public accommodation" under Title II. Subsequent courts
have used this language to establish a physical location require-
ment for membership organizations to be public accommoda-
tions. 8 The opinion described a public accommodation using the
words in § 2000a(b): as a facility, a structure, an establishment,
and a place." The opinion does not attempt to define any of these
terms, except to differentiate membership organizations which
are instead defined as "mere gatherings of people. ° The Welsh
court's general concern was that including membership organiza-
tions under Title II would potentially define many social relation-
ships, such as groups of acquaintances meeting together, as pub-
lic accommodations. For the court, this most certainly was not the
intent of the enacting Congress. 1
The Supreme Court in Boy Scouts of America v Dale4' sug-
gested a possible expansion of the Welsh court's "physical loca-
tion" requirement. 3 Dale rejected a challenge under New Jersey's
state public accommodations law to the Boy Scouts' policy of de-
nying membership to homosexuals." The Supreme Court declined
to apply the statute to the Boy Scouts, finding the statute viola-
tive of the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right to expressive asso-
ciation." In dicta, however, the Court devoted a short paragraph
to discussing whether the Boy Scouts even qualified as a public
accommodation.6 The Court noted that while state public accom-
Auerbach decision makes the other courts' positions more difficult to conceptualize. Auer-
bach is, in fact, an outlier on this issue. See Part II B 1 for a detailed discussion.
37 See Welsh, 993 F2d at 1272.
3 See, for example, Clegg v Cult Awareness Network, 18 F3d 752, 756 (9th Cir 1994)
(holding that a membership organization was not a public accommodation because it had
no connection to a physical facility).
'" See Welsh, 993 F2d at 1269-75. Some, but not all of these references describe
'place" in physical terms (such as a "physical facility" or a "physical structure").
40 See id at 1275.
41 Id. ("In Title II Congress focused exclusively on prohibiting discrimination in places
of public accommodation and not in every conceivable social relationship.").
42 530 US 640 (2000).
41 See id at 657.
See id at 659.
45 See id at 649-50.
46 See Dale, 530 US at 657.
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modations laws originally protected only "traditional public ac-
commodations" such as "inns and trains," states had started ex-
panding the definition to include more "places."7 Chief Justice
Rehnquist said that New Jersey expanded its statute to even
more locations than other states, but should not have "applied its
public accommodations law to a private entity without even at-
tempting to tie the term 'place' to a physical location. ' This
statement implies that it is the "physical" nature of an entity that
makes it a public accommodation.
Like the Welsh court, however, the Dale Court did not define
physical location, except to conclude that the definition does not
include the Boy Scouts."9 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
cited Welsh and four state court decisions that interpreted their
respective state public accommodation laws to exclude the Boy
Scouts as a public accommodation. ° None of these statutes clearly
defined the term "public accommodation," and none used the term
"physical" in defining "public accommodation."' The Dale dicta
" See id. The Court did not elaborate on what those "places" are in state statutes
nationwide, but noted that under New Jersey law these "places" include taverns, retail
shops, and libraries. See id.
Id. This troubled the Court because applying Title II to organizations increases the
.potential for conflict" between Title II and First Amendment rights to expressive associa-
tion. See Dale, 530 US at 657.
41 See id.
5o Id at 657 n 3, citing Curran v Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of America, 952
P2d 218, 228 (Cal 1998) (rejecting the Boy Scouts as a public accommodation under Cali-
fornia's Unruh Civil Rights Act, which requires equal accommodations in "all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever"); Seabourn v Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts
of America, 891 P2d 385, 405 (Kan 1995) (rejecting the Boy Scouts as a public accommoda-
tion under the Kansas Act Against Discrimination, which prohibits discrimination in
"public accommodations" defined similarly as those in the Civil Rights Act); Quinnipiac
Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc v Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities,
528 A2d 352, 357-58 (Conn 1987) (rejecting the Boy Scouts as a public accommodation
under Connecticut's state public accommodations law, which defines public accommoda-
tions as "any establishment ... which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to
the general public"); Schwenk v Boy Scouts of America, 551 P2d 465, 469 (Or 1976) (reject-
ing the Boy Scouts as a public accommodation under the Oregon Public Accommodation
Act which defines public accommodations as "any place or service offering to the public
accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges whether in the nature of goods, ser-
vices, lodgings, amusements or otherwise").
" See Cal Civ Code § 51 (West 1982 & Supp 2002) ("All persons ... are entitled to the
full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all busi-
ness establishments of every kind whatsoever."); Conn Gen Stat Ann § 46a-63 (West 2002)
("'Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement' means any establishment which
caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not
limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commer-
cial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent."); Kan Stat Ann § 44-1002(h)
(2001) ('Public accommodations' means any person who caters or offers goods, services,
facilities and accommodations to the public. Public accommodations include, but are not
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suggests a further limitation to Welsh by not expressly conceding
that organizations connected to a physical structure can be public
accommodations.
2. Welsh applied to other membership organizations.
In Clegg v Cult Awareness Network,2 the Ninth Circuit ex-
panded the Welsh physical location requirement to organizations
beyond the Boy Scouts." Frizell Clegg, an African American and a
Scientologist, claimed that the organization Cult Awareness vio-
lated Title II by refusing to allow him to become a member." In
rejecting Clegg's claim, the court relied on Welsh to hold that Cult
Awareness, because it was a membership organization, did not
fall within the purview of Title II." The Clegg decision further
clarified the Welsh court's interpretation of Title II by holding
that organizations fell within its scope "only when they are affili-
ated with a place open to the public and membership in the or-
ganization is a necessary predicate to the use of the facility."'
Like Welsh, the court cited the example of a YMCA-operated pub-
lic gym as an example of an organization that Title II would regu-
late.5
3. Implications for interactive sites.
Like other decisions addressing whether membership organi-
zations fall under the purview of Title II, Welsh does not neces-
limited to, any lodging establishment or food service establishment ... any bar, tavern,
barbershop, beauty parlor, theater, skating rink, bowling alley, billiard parlor, amusement
park, recreation park, swimming pool, lake, gymnasium, mortuary or cemetery which is
open to the public; or any public transportation facility. Public accommodations do not
include a religious or nonprofit fraternal or social association or corporation."); Or Rev
Stat § 659A.400 (2001) ("A place of public accommodation ... means any place or service
offering to the public accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges whether in the
nature of goods, services, lodgings, amusements, or otherwise. However a place of public
accommodation does not include any institution, bona fide club or place of accommodation
which is in its nature distinctly private.").
52 18 F3d 752 (9th Cir 1994).
53 See id at 754 (applying Welsh to a nonprofit organization that provided information
and outreach services to former cult members).
' Id. Cult Awareness did not explain its refuse to allow Clegg to join, but Clegg al-
leged discrimination based on both his racial and his religious status. See id at 753-54.
55 18 F3d at 755.
' Id at 756.
57 See id at 755, citing Smith v YMCA of Montgomery, 462 F2d 634, 636 (5th Cir
1972). Under Dale, however, it is no longer clear whether Title 1 could permissibly cover
these facilities if regulation limits the YMCA's right to expressive association. See text
accompanying note 45.
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sarily bar the inclusion of the internet as a public accommodation
under Title II. Courts could categorize internet chat rooms and
bulletin boards as "gatherings of people" that are not tied to
physical places. As such, Title II would not regulate them." If
courts conclude that these internet forums have a specific loca-
tion, namely at the specific physical address on the internet
where interactive sites have provided space for them, these inter-
net chat rooms and bulletin boards could qualify as Title II public
accommodations, even under Welsh. Similarly, the Dale court
could reach a similar finding as long as it was convinced that
internet chat rooms and bulletin boards were not, in fact, mem-
bership organizations. To decide whether to apply Title II to the
internet, however, courts following Welsh must determine
whether internet chat rooms and bulletin boards have a connec-
tion to a physical location. The Boy Scouts cases do not offer an
answer to this question.
II. REGULATION OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE ADA
Although few cases under the Civil Rights Act even analo-
gously apply to the internet, courts have extensively addressed
the regulation of non-physical entities under Title III of the
ADA,59 analyzing in depth many of the same issues that the Boy
Scouts cases do not fully address in the Title II context. o Particu-
larly in the public accommodations context, where the two stat-
utes are similar, analysis of the language and judicial precedent
surrounding the ADA"' suggests ways in which Title II regulation
might develop in the future. In addition, an analysis of scholar-
ship on the ADA public accommodations decisions also suggests
the internet should be considered a public accommodation under
Title II. 2 Although some aspects of the ADA are broader than Ti-
See Welsh, 993 F2d at 1269 (holding that membership organizations must be con-
nected to a physical facility for Title II to regulate them).
69 42 USC § 12181 (1999) et seq.
60 See, for example, Doe v Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co, 179 F3d 557, 559 (7th Cir
1999) (holding that Title III of the ADA extends to public accommodations in electronic
space), citing Carparts Distribution Center, Inc, v Automotive Wholesaler Association of
New England, 37 F3d 12, 19 (1st Cir 1994) (finding that the "plain meaning" of entities
Title III defined as public accommodations did not "require 'public accommodations' to
have physical structures for persons to enter"); Parker v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co,
121 F3d 1006, 1012-13 (6th Cir 1997) (holding that Title III of the ADA does not regulate
insurance underwriting practices).
61 To avoid confusion between Title II and Title III, this Comment occasionally refers
to Title III of the ADA simply as "the ADA."
62 See Part II C.
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tle II, drawing analogies between the two statutes is appropriate;
the Supreme Court recently used Title II precedent to support a
decision regarding the ADA, noting that public accommodation
regulation under the Civil Rights Act parallels that same regula-
tion under the ADA.0
A. Public Accommodations Defined in the ADA
In much the same manner that Title II prohibits discrimina-
tion based on race, color, religion or national origin, Title III of
the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled." In con-
trast to Title II's short enumeration of public accommodations,
the ADA's enumeration is much more detailed and ultimately
encompasses a broader definition of public accommodation.'
Title III's enumeration of public accommodation includes,
among other things, auditoriums, convention centers, museums,
and libraries." It also includes the same catch-all language as
Title II, stating that "other places of exhibition or entertainment"
also might be public accommodations. 6 The language of the ADA
goes even further; in addition to enumerated establishments,
"other places of public gathering" can also be public accommoda-
tions.6 The language "places of public gathering," which is not
part of Title II, may more easily include internet chat rooms and
bulletin boards. Additionally, the fact that the ADA generally
encompasses a much broader range of facilities has led one com-
mentator to conclude that courts are more likely to deem the
internet a public accommodation under the ADA than under the
Civil Rights Act.69
6 See PGA Tour, Inc v Martin, 532 US 661, 680 (2001) (finding the Professional Golf-
ers' Association Tour to be a public accommodation under the ADA).
64 See 42 USC § 12182(a) ("No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis
of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.").
6 See 42 USC § 12191(7).
66 See 42 USC § 12191(7)(d)-(1).
67 See 42 USC § 12191(7)(c).
42 USC § 12191(7)(d).
69 See Matthew A. Stowe, Note, Interpreting "Place of Public Accommodation" under
Title II of the ADA: A Technical Determination with Potentially Broad Civil Rights Impli-
cations, 50 Duke L J 297, 327-28 (2000) (suggesting that Title II jurisprudence also in-
forms a discussion of ADA jurisprudence).
409] 419
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
B. Public Accommodations under the ADA
In addition to being a broader statute with more specific ex-
amples of public accommodations, the ADA also has a more de-
veloped body of case law than Title II does from which to analyze
the inclusion of interactive sites as a public accommodation.
Courts have examined three separate public accommodation is-
sues under the ADA that are relevant to the interactive site ques-
tion: (1) like the Boy Scouts cases, membership organizations as
public accommodations under the Act; ° (2) what types of access,
physical or economic, the ADA should regulate;"1 and (3) public
accommodations in electronic space.72 While only a few of these
cases discuss the internet as a public accommodation, all suggest
that current interpretations of the ADA do not preclude the in-
clusion of the internet as a public accommodation.
1. Membership organizations under the ADA.
Courts have rejected membership organizations as public
accommodations under the ADA for the same reason that Clegg
and Welsh rejected them as public accommodations under Title
II: courts do not consider membership organizations to be public
accommodations where they are not tied to a physical facility.73
Under this logic, courts have rejected claims made by a national
youth hockey organization and a local youth hockey league; 4 the
70 See, for example, Matthews v NCAA, 79 F Supp 2d 1199, 1206 (E D Wa 1999) (de-
nying motion for preliminary injunction and holding that the complaint fails because the
NCAA is not connected to an actual place).
71 See, for example Parker v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 121 F3d 1006, 1012-13
(6th Cir 1997) (holding that the ADA only regulates physical facilities).
72 See, for example, Doe v Mutual of Omaha Insurance, 179 F3d 557, 559 (7th Cir
1999) (suggesting that the ADA regulates public accommodations in electronic space).
73 See Matthews v NCAA, 79 F Supp 2d 1199, 1206 (E D Wa 1999); Brown v 1995
Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge, 959 F Supp 496, 499 (N D 111 1997) (holding that an
organization sponsoring a bicycle race is not a public accommodation because it is not tied
to a physical place); Elitt v USA Hockey, 922 F Supp 217, 223 (E D Mo 1996) (denying
motion for a temporary restraining order, noting that USA Hockey is an organization that
is not tied to a physical place); Schaaf v Association of Educational Therapists, 1995 WL
381979, *2 (N D Cal) (granting summary judgment on Title III claim because the defen-
dant, as an organization without a tie to a physical place, is not a public accommodation).
But see Shultz v Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc, 943 F Supp 1222, 1225 (C D Cal 1996)
(holding that a youth baseball league is a place of public accommodation because it was
connected to a field and a concession stand).
14 See Elitt, 922 F Supp at 223. In light of the other arena and sports opinions under
the ADA, this case seems to be wrongly decided. Compare Shultz, 943 F Supp at 1225
(holding that a youth baseball league is a place of public accommodation because it was
connected to a field and a concession stand). In its opinion, the Elitt court made no effort
to examine whether or not the local hockey league leased the ice rinks where its teams
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National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") and a local
collegiate athletic conference (the PAC-10);5 an organized bicycle
767
race; and an association of therapists. However, a court has
found a youth baseball league to be a public accommodation
where that league was tied to a baseball field and a concession
stand." These cases all demonstrate a fundamental judicial con-
cern that ADA public accommodations must either be a physical
facility or have strong ties to a physical facility.
These opinions seem to focus more closely on the ways a
membership organization is tied to a facility. Under the ADA,
courts have required a showing of control over the facility;79 a
leasing or rental of the facility;80 or ties to a particular rather than
multiple or various facilities. 1 This is a stricter interpretation
than Clegg or Welsh articulated in the Title II context. 2
2. Whether the ADA regulates economic access to goods and
services.
Judicial standards governing whether membership organiza-
tions are public accommodations under the ADA are relatively
clear that such organizations must have ties to a physical facility.
Currently, however, courts are split on a different aspect of the
held practices and games, which the league almost surely must have done. The court
merely noted that Elitt had not demonstrated denial of access to the ice rink itself. See id.
Since the league did not permit Elitt to participate, however, he was denied access to the
rink.
76 See Matthews, 79 F Supp 2d at 1206. National athletic associations, such as the
NCAA here or USA Hockey in the Elitt case, are treated as "umbrella" organizations and
do not fall within the ADA because they do not have control over the public accommoda-
tions in which member organizations hold athletic events. See id at 1205.
76 See Brown, 959 F Supp at 499. In this case, the court found that the race took place
on roads, tying it to a physical location, but these roads were public roads that a public
accommodation neither owned nor leased and that the court found not to be a "physical
structure" as required by the ADA. See id at 498-99.
77 See Schaaf, 1995 WL 381979 at *2. This opinion seems to contradict Auerbach v
African Americans Teachers Association, 356 F Supp 1046, 1048 (E D NY 1973) (holding
that a teachers association that held regular meetings at a public school was a Title II
public accommodation). The Schaaf court was concerned that the therapist organization,
while holding meetings in some physical facilities such as restaurants and hotels, also
held meetings in private homes, and was therefore not tied to a "particular" place. 1995
WL 381979 at *2. In Auerbach, the association meetings were held regularly at the same
public school, see 356 F Supp at 1048, satisfying a particularity requirement, but the
question remains whether a school is a public accommodation under Title II.
78 See Shultz, 943 F Supp at 1225.
79 See Matthews, 79 F Supp 2d at 1205.
8 See Elitt, 992 F Supp at 223; Brown, 959 F Supp at 489-99.
81 See Schaaf, 1995 WL 381979 at *2
82 See Part I B.
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ADA: whether Title III regulates insurance offerings.8 The courts
examining these issues couch their opinions in the language of
physical access, creating confusion about how these opinions de-
fine public accommodations under the Act. By probing the under-
lying issues in each of these cases, however, one can see that the
division between courts is really only about what kinds of access
the ADA should regulate. Some courts have held that the ADA
only requires equal physical access to facilities," while other
courts have held that the ADA also requires equal economic ac-
cess to the goods and services facilities offer.8 Thus, these cases
do not alter the definition of "public accommodations;" they only
concern the level of equal access public accommodations must
provide.
a) The broad view of access: equal economic access to
goods and services. The first judicial decision appearing to extend
ADA regulation to economic access was Carparts Distribution
Center v Auto Wholesaler's Association of New England.' In this
case, the Auto Wholesaler's Association provided medical insur-
ance to its members who, like Carparts, were small businesses.87
That insurance plan placed a lower limit on policy benefits for
AIDS-related conditions. After recognizing this insurance cap as
a valid ADA public accommodations claim, the Carparts court
overturned the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss the
case.
While noting that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that
the defendant association was an ADA public accommodation, the
' See EEOC v Aramark Corp, Inc, 208 F3d 266, 268 (DC Cir 2000) (recognizing the
circuit split and holding, under an unrelated ADA provision, that stricter limitations on
insurance benefits for those with mental or psychological disabilities did not violate the
ADA).
Parker v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 121 F3d 1006, 1012-13 (6th Cir 1997)
(holding that the ADA does not regulate economic access).
88 Pallozzi v Allstate Life Insurance, 198 F3d 28, 32 (2d Cir 1999) (holding that the
ADA does regulate economic access).
86 37 F3d 12 (1st Cir 1994).87 See id at 12-33.
88 See id at 13. The plan capped benefits for AIDS-related illnesses at $25,000. For all
other illnesses, the plan capped benefits at $1,000,000. See id.89 Carparts, 37 F3d at 12. The district court dismissed plaintiff's Title III claim be-
cause it found that the association was not an "actual physical structurtel with definite
physical boundaries which a person physically enters for the purpose of utilizing the facili-
ties or obtaining services therein." See id at 18. The plaintiff also had claims under unre-
lated sections of the ADA, which the Circuit Court also believed the district court erred in
dismissing. See id at 19.
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Carparts court left open the possibility that the district court
could define the association as a public accommodation.' The
court examined the ADA's plain language and commented that
Title III is not limited to instances when a person physically en-
ters a business to purchase goods or services.9 The Carparts court
reached this conclusion by analyzing the ADA's list of public ac-
commodations 9 and determining that some of the listed entities
did not necessarily interact with the public through physical es-
tablishments alone.3
The court also attributed a broad purpose to the ADA, noting
that limiting
the application of Title III to physical structures which
persons must enter to obtain goods and services would run
afoul of the purposes of the ADA and would severely frus-
trate Congress's intent that individuals with disabilities
fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages,
available indiscriminately to other members of the general
public.9
The court reasoned that it would be unreasonable to provide pro-
tection to people who purchased insurance in a physical office but
not to those who purchased insurance over the telephone or
through the mail.95 Based on this analysis, the Carparts court in-
terpreted the ADA to apply to a wide range of business and ser-
vice establishments, both physical and non-physical,' in an effort
to ensure equal economic access to insurance offerings.
The Second Circuit, in Pallozzi v Allstate Life Insurance,9
explicitly implemented the Carparts court's view of Title III. In
Pallozzi, the defendant insurer argued that because the ADA
enumerated "insurance offices" rather than "insurance compa-
nies" as public accommodations, Congress only intended to regu-
late the physical accessibility of insurance offices, not their un-
90 See id at 12.
91 See Carparts, 37 F3d at 20.
92 See 42 USC § 12191(7)(d).
93 Carparts, 37 F3d at 19. The specific entities the court mentioned are service estab-
lishments (shoe repair, travel services) and professional officers (doctors, lawyers, ac-
countants). These are not enumerated entities under the Civil Rights Act. See 42 USC
§ 2000a(b).
Carparts, 37 F3d at 19.
95 Id.
See id.
97 198 F3d 28 (2d Cir 1999).
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derwriting practices. 8 Citing Carparts, the Pallozzi court rejected
this narrow interpretation of the ADA, commenting that the ADA
"was meant to guarantee [the disabled] more than mere physical
access" to public accommodations." The court also recognized that
the insurance company defendant had to be a public accommoda-
tion in order for the ADA to regulate its insurance underwriting,
but noted that this issue was not in dispute in the case.'0 Both
Pallozzi and Carparts broadly interpreted what it means for a
public accommodation to deny "access" to goods and services.
b) The narrow view of access: threshold physical access to
a public accommodation. Three other circuits, while recognizing
that Title III regulates threshold physical access to a public ac-
commodation, rejected an expansion of Title III to also regulate
economic access to goods and services.' In the course of these
opinions, the courts offered varying definitions of what threshold
physical access to a public accommodation entails.
In McNeil v Time Insurance Co,' the court held that an in-
surer that capped benefits for patients with AIDS did not violate
the ADA because the ADA did not "regulate the content of goods
and services that are offered."' The Fifth Circuit acknowledged
that an insurance company cannot completely deny physical ac-
cess to its goods or services, but rejected the Pallozzi holding that
the ADA also governed the substance of those goods or services." '
In so holding, however, the McNeil court did not define what
"physical access" meant, or what constituted a "public accommo-
dation" under the Act.'0 '
The Sixth Circuit, while also rejecting economic access regu-
lation, has been more explicit in strictly limiting the ADA's defi-
nition of public accommodations to physical places.0' In Parker v
" Id at 32.
99 Id.
'00 Id at 32 n 3.
'0' See Parker, 121 F3d at 1012-13 (excluding disability insurance provision from
ADA's public accommodation provision); McNeil v Time Insurance Co, 205 F3d 179, 186
(5th Cir 2000) (concurring with Parker); Ford v Schering-Plough Corp, 145 F3d 601 (3d
Cir 1998) (same).
102 205 F3d 179 (5th Cir 2000).
'0 See id at 186.
104 See id at 188.
'o' See id. This is logical, however, given that the list of public accommodations under
the ADA is so much more detailed than Title II. See Part II A.
'o See Parker, 121 F3d at 1012-13 (holding that disability insurance is not a public
accommodation under the ADA).
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Metropolitan Life Insurance,7 the Sixth Circuit addressed the
question of insurance offerings under the ADA, and found that
insurers that capped benefits for mental but not physical disabili-
ties did not violate the ADA."0 The opinion bluntly stated, "[A]
public accommodation is a physical place.'""u The court intended
this statement as a means of distinguishing places from services
such as insurance offerings. " ° Later in the opinion, the court ex-
plained that "[tihe purpose of the ADA's public accommodations
requirements is to ensure accessibility to the goods offered by a
public accommodation, not to alter the nature or mix of goods
that the public accommodation has typically provided."'' This
holding concurs with McNeil that insurers must offer insurance
to the disabled but that they do not need to alter the terms of the
insurance to make it equally valuable to the disabled."2
Likewise, in Ford v Schering-Plough Corp" the Third Circuit
explicitly disagreed with Carparts."' Ford upheld the dismissal of
a Title III claim made against an insurer that capped benefits for
mental but not for physical disabilities."' The court could have
concluded that because the plaintiff received insurance through
her employment, the insurance was a private rather than a pub-
lic offering and therefore not the service of a public accommoda-
107 121 F3d 1006 (6th Cir 1997).
'0' See id.
'09 See id at 1010. The Sixth Circuit cited Stoutenborough v National Football League,
59 F3d 580, 583 (6th Cir 1995) (determining that broadcasts of professional football games
are not ADA public accommodations). In Stoutenborough, the court rejected a Title III
ADA claim made by hearing-impaired people who argued that the National Football
League's ("NFL") television "blackout" rule denied them access to a public accommodation.
See id at 582. Engaging in a careful analysis of Title III's language, the court held that
neither the NFL nor the television broadcast of its games were ADA public accommoda-
tions because they were not "places." See id at 583. In addition, the broadcast was not a
service of the public accommodation because the NFL leased the broadcast to a television
station that then transmitted it into homes. See id. The court distinguished .between "the
services the public accommodation offers" and "the services which the lessor of a public
accommodation offers." Stoutenborough, 59 F3d at 583.
The Stoutenborough court could also have decided this case under an economic
access theory. During blackouts, in choosing only to broadcast the game over the radio, all
the television station was doing was providing a service that was less valuable to the
hearing impaired than it was to other users. No matter who offers the service, under a
narrow view of the ADA the broadcast is not the type of access the ADA regulates.
110 See Parker, 121 F3d at 1012.
111 See id.
112 See McNeil, 205 F3d at 186.
113 145 F3d 601 (3d Cir 1998).
114 See id at 613-14.
110 Id at 603.
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tion."6 Instead, the court held that the plaintiff did not have a
physical connection to the insurance office itself as its interpreta-
tion of the ADA required."7
Ford cited Welsh and Clegg, both Title II public accommoda-
tion cases, and noted that these courts limited public accommoda-
tions to places.1 Like Parker and McNeil, Ford rejected interpret-
ing the ADA to regulate economic access. The Ford court applied
Title II case law to hold that the ADA only covers "places with
resources utilized by physical access.'. 9 Although this court dis-
agreed with Carparts, it engaged in the same extensive analysis
of the physical/non-physical characteristics of the public accom-
modation as a way of reaching its primary concern: whether the
regulation of economic access to insurance is appropriate under
Title III.
3. Public accommodations in electronic space: Doe v Mutual
of Omaha Insurance.'
In the midst of this split on the issue of economic access, the
Seventh Circuit relied on precedent from both sides of the debate
to offer a new interpretation of the ADA and the internet in Doe v
Mutual of Omaha Insurance. The case involved an AIDS-related
insurance cap similar to the one in Carparts.1 2' Following the logic
of Parker, McNeil, and Ford, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
plaintiffs' claim, holding that the ADA does not require insurers
or other facilities to "configure a service to make it as valuable to
a disabled as to a nondisabled customer."2
Mutual of Omaha also emphasized the issue of threshold ac-
cess, making it clear that insurers violate the ADA if they refuse
to sell an insurance policy to someone with AIDS." A great deal
of the opinion analyzed what threshold access entails. In the
16 The Seventh Circuit used this reasoning to reject a similar claim. See Morgan v
Joint Administration Board, 268 F3d 456 (7th Cir 2001) (holding that because an em-
ployee received her insurance through her employer, it was a private offering and not a
public accommodation).
. 117 See Ford, 145 F3d at 612-13. The plaintiff's employer received insurance for its
employees from MetLife, but the court said Ford had no connection to MetLife's physical
insurance office, and therefore MetLife had not discriminated against her. See id.
11s Id at 613, citing Welsh, 993 F2d at 1269, and Clegg, 18 F3d at 755-56.
19 See Ford, 145 F3d at 613.
120 179 F3d 557 (7th Cir 1999).
121 See id at 558.
122 See id at 559-60.
12M See Mutual of Omaha, 179 F3d at 559.
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course of rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, Judge Posner, speaking
for the court, stated that the ADA means
that the owner or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant,
dentist's office, travel agency, theater, Web site or other fa-
cility (whether in physical space or electronic space) that is
open to the public cannot exclude disabled persons from
entering the facility and, once in, from using the facility in
the same way that the nondisabled do.'24
This language describes a "Web site" as a type of facility covered
by the ADA, on par with stores and hotels -establishments the
Welsh court considered traditional public accommodations.n In
articulating the public accommodations that the ADA covers,
Judge Posner specifically included "electronic space," but also dif-
ferentiated this space from physical space, leaving open the ques-
tion of whether electronic space is "physical" space or something
else. The Mutual of Omaha court relied on Carparts to extend its
definition of threshold access beyond access to traditional public
accommodations, 12 6 but in rejecting the plaintiffs' claim also re-
jected the Carparts conclusion that extending threshold access to
non-physical accommodations also meant extending threshold
access to economic access.
127
124 Id (emphasis added). The facts of Mutual of Omaha do not involve electronic space,
and no commentators have attempted to explain why Judge Posner chose to discuss this
facet of ADA expansion in this particular case.
125 Welsh, 993 F2d at 1269.
126 See Mutual of Omaha, 179 F3d at 559, citing Carparts, 37 F3d at 20 (noting that
the ADA would be frustrated if did not apply to purchases of goods and services in non-
physical instances).
127 The Seventh Circuit also reaffirmed the Mutual of Omaha decision in another
insurance case, Morgan v Joint Administration Board, 268 F3d 456 (7th Cir 2001), involv-
ing an ADA claim related to a program that granted cost of living increases to regular but
not to disability retirees. See id at 457. Only employees, not the public, received the insur-
ance offering in the case, leading the Morgan court to recognize that the limited availabil-
ity of the offering rendered it non-public. See id at 459. Still, the court restated its Mutual
of Omaha reasoning, noting that "the site of the sale [of insurance] is irrelevant to Con-
gress's goal of granting the disabled equal access to sellers of goods and services." See id.
Although extending threshold access to non-physical establishments in Mutual of Omaha
and Morgan, the Seventh Circuit still may not go as far as to extend the ADA to member-
ship organizations without ties to a physical facility. See Brown, 959 F Supp at 499 (hold-
ing that an organization sponsoring a bicycle race is not a public accommodation). In
Brown, access to the service in question, participation in the bicycle race, does not raise
the same kind of disparate protection concerns that the Mutual of Omaha raised; Mutual
of Omaha extended threshold access to nonphysical accommodations because the court
had concerns about disparate protection between people who made purchased insurance in
a physical office and those that made the purchase over the telephone or through the mail.
See Mutual of Omaha, 179 F3d at 559. Brown suggests that even those circuits with an
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C. Applying Title II to the Internet in View of
ADA Jurisprudence
ADA jurisprudence provides several ways of interpreting the
ADA's public accommodations provisions: the Carparts view that
the ADA governs economic access to the goods and services of
public accommodations;" the Parker view that the ADA only gov-
erns access to physical facilities;" and the Mutual of Omaha view
that, while the ADA only governs threshold access, it includes
threshold access to public accommodations in electronic space.13"
The Mutual of Omaha view most clearly suggests that the inter-
net could be a public accommodation under Title II, but impor-
tantly the opinion does distinguish between "physical space" and
"electronic space.' 3' For courts following the narrow view that
Title II only governs "physical space," this opinion leaves room to
exclude "electronic space" from that definition.
This choice in approaches and the existing circuit split on
non-physical locations under the ADA has contributed to a deluge
of scholarship on the applicability of the ADA to the internet,
with scholars arguing on both sides of the issue. 3 However,
expansive view of the ADA might continue to hold organizations outside the purview of
the ADA.
'28 37 F3d at 19.
129 121 F3d at 1012-13.
130 179 F3d at 559.
131 See id.
132 See generally Kelly Konkright, Comment, An Analysis of the Applicability of Title
III of the Americans with Disabilities Act to Private Internet Access Providers, 37 Idaho L
Rev 713, 727 (2001) (arguing against inclusion); Patrick Maroney, The Wrong Tool for the
Right Job: Are Commercial Websites Places of Public Accommodation under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990?, 2 Vand J Enter L & Prac 191 (2000) (same); Jonathan Bick,
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Internet, 10 Albany L J of Sci & Tech 205, 206-07
(2000) (arguing for inclusion of the ADA); Stowe, Note, 50 Duke L J at 297 (cited in note
69) (same); Jeffrey Scott Ranen, Note, Was Blind but Now I See: The Argument for ADA
Applicability to the Internet, 22 BC Third World L J 389 (2002) (same); Cassandra Burke
Robertson, Providing Access to the Future: How the Americans with Disabilities Act Can
Remove Barriers in Cyberspace, 79 Denver U L Rev 199 (2001) (arguing that websites are
public accommodations, and advancing solutions for other barriers to plaintiffs' claims
against inaccessible websites); Paul Taylor, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Internet, 7 BU J Sci & Tech L 26 (2001) (discussing recent developments but taking no
position on the issue of inclusion). A case analogous to Noah in the Title II context
prompted much of the scholarship on the internet as a public accommodation under the
ADA. See Complaint, National Federation of the Blind, Inc v AOL Time Warner, Inc, Civil
Action No 99-12303 (D Mass 1999), available online at <http://www.education-
rights.org/homenfbvaol.html> (visited Nov 15, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F]. In its
complaint, the National Federation for the Blind argued that AOL violated the ADA by
failing to make its software compatible with software that interpret web sites for the
blind. See id at 31, 34, 37. The lawsuit eventually settled when AOL agreed to make
future versions of its software compatible with the interpretation software. See Hiawatha
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scholarship analyzing whether internet forums are public ac-
commodations under the ADA analyze this issue in a manner
that does not suggest answers to the analogous question in the
Title II context.
Commentators arguing for inclusion point to the ADA's broad
mandate to eliminate discrimination in many areas of public life,
and conclude that the internet should be included as well. M
Commentators arguing for exclusion also refer to the purposes of
the Act to argue the internet should be excluded." Opponents to
expansion rely heavily on the Parker determination that the ADA
does not regulate economic access. '  These economic access con-
siderations, however, do not necessarily limit Title II's applica-
tion to the internet. Even in jurisdictions that exclude insurance
offerings from the purview of the ADA (or from Title II), courts
trying to apply ADA precedent to the Title II context have a dis-
tinct choice. On the one hand, they can analogize discrimination
in internet chat rooms and bulletin boards to a denial of equal
economic access to a service; treating access to a web site as a
service like providing someone with insurance. Alternatively,
they can treat internet web sites as physical locations, meaning,
like Mutual of Omaha, the ADA and Title II regulate threshold
Bray, Group behind Blind-Access Suit Resolves Suit with AOL, Boston Globe E4 (July 27,
2000).
133 See Stowe, Note, 50 Duke L J at 297-99 (cited in note 69) (arguing that "[Title III]
should be interpreted to include membership organizations with no ties to physical facili-
ties"); Bick, 10 Albany L J of Sci & Tech at 208 (cited in note 132) ("[Tlhe public accommo-
dations requirements cover almost all facets of American life in which members of the
public come into contact with a business or other entity."); Ranen, Note, 22 BC Third
World L J at 404 (cited in note 132) ("A broad reading of the legislative history of the ADA
supports the theory that the Internet is a public accommodation and subject to Title III of
the ADA."). These authors argue that the enacting Congress intended the ADA to provide
disabled people with "equal access" to goods and services, suggesting that the internet, as
a source of goods and services, should also be included.
134 See Konkright, Comment, 37 Idaho L Rev at 723 (cited in note 132) (noting that
while the enacting Congress may have intended to ensure equal access to goods and ser-
vices, it still only listed physical establishments in the statute itself);, Maroney, 2 Vand J
Enter L & Prac at 204 (cited in note 132) (interpreting the purpose of the ADA as one of
physical access to goods and services, and consequently concluding that "[a]lthough the
intentionally broad purpose and design of the ADA make the statute an attractive avenue
for advocates of online expansion, that same purpose and design limit Title III to physical
facilities.").
13 See Konkright, Comment, 37 Idaho L Rev at 741 (cited in note 132) (analyzing the
National Federation for the Blind lawsuit and arguing that under Parker, AOL is not
required to make its web site equally valuable to blind and non-blind users); Maroney, 2
Vand J Enter L & Prac at 203 (cited in note 132) (recognizing that because web sites do
not have to allow equal access to content, they would only have to modify navigational
links and the core site map).
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access to the accommodation.'3 ' This is why Mutual of Omaha,
while rejecting an equal economic access theory, still suggested
that courts have the power to regulate threshold access to the
internet under the ADA.
How extensively courts will interpret and rely on ADA analy-
sis in addressing internet forums under Title II depends in part
on how other courts react to Mutual of Omaha and its reasoning.
Unfortunately, courts may be slow in resolving this issue; no
internet ADA cases have been filed since the AOL case. In addi-
tion, many site operators are voluntarily complying with ADA
provisions in making their web sites accessible to those with dis-
abilities.3 ' Consequently, while courts and scholars have analyzed
much more thoroughly the position of web sites under the ADA
than they have Title II, this analysis does not provide many con-
crete answers in the Title II context.
III. PURPOSES OF TITLE II
This Comment has argued that neither the ADA nor Title II
precedent excludes interactive sites from Title II's reach. Fur-
thermore, excluding interactive sites would also undercut one of
the central purposes of Title II: to end discrimination in public
accommodations affecting interstate commerce.'" One can inter-
pret possible purposes of Title II by analyzing its plain language
and its legislative history.
A. The Plain Language of Title II: Defining "Place"
An initial starting point for examining legislative purpose is
to look at the wording of the statute.'.. ".When the words of a stat-
136 See Mutual of Omaha, 179 F3d at 559.
,37 See Carrie Johnson, Agencies Act to Ease Use of Internet by Disabled, Wash Post
A23 (Aug 24, 2000) (discussing advances in internet accessibility to the disabled). Patrick
Maroney suggested that market forces would keep web sites from becoming accessible
unless Congress or the courts stepped in. See 2 Vand J Enter L & Prac at 203 (cited in
note 132). So far, however, it appears that government action is largely unnecessary.
1 Civil Rights Act of 1963, HR Rep No 914, 88th Cong, 1st Sess 21 (1963), reprinted
in 1964 USSCAN 2494. For a more detailed discussion of the legislative history, see Part
III B.
139 See Richards v United States, 369 US 1, 9 (1962), quoted in Welsh, 993 F2d at 1269
("[W]e must always be cognizant of the fact that 'the legislative purpose is expressed by
the ordinary meaning of the words used.'"). See also Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legis-
lation at 819 (cited in note 17) (discussing the process of statutory interpretation).
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ute are unambiguous ... judicial inquiry is complete. 14' Title II's
plain language, however, does not conclusively include or exclude
interactive sites within the definition of public accommodations.
As noted earlier, Title II includes "other place[s] of exhibition or
entertainment" as public accommodations.1 1 An obvious initial
question is whether web sites can qualify as "places" under Title
II. The statute does not define this term. 142 In addition, internet
chat rooms and bulletin boards may not provide exhibition or en-
tertainment, falling outside Title II for that additional reason."
The plain meaning of the word "place," particularly without a
statutory definition, is unclear. The Welsh opinion illustrates the
vagueness of this word by interchanging the words "structure,"
"establishment," and "location" to define what it means in Title
II.'" When the statutory meaning of a word is unclear, the Su-
preme Court frequently looks to a dictionary definition for guid-
ance.' For a term as broad as "place," Webster's Dictionary pro-
vides multiple definitions for the word "place," from the more spe-
cific ("building or locality used for a specific purpose") to the
ubiquitous ("specific locality," "physical environment," "physical
surroundings," "indefinite region or expanse"). " Some of these
definitions assume that a "place" must be physical, but others do
not. 
7
Even those definitions that assume "places" are physical do
not automatically exclude the internet. Several, but not all, of the
Webster's definitions also employ the word "physical"-a term
employed and manipulated in both ADA and Title II case law.
14 8
' Connecticut National Bank v Germain, 503 US 249, 254 (1992) (holding that be-
cause a statute was silent on the issue of interlocutory appeals, the statute did not limit
those appeals).
141 42 USC § 2000a(b)(3). See also Part I A.
142 For a discussion of the internet as a "place," see Part IV A.
'43 For a discussion of how to characterize chat rooms and bulletin boards, see Part IV
C.
1 See Welsh, 993 F2d at 1269 (using "structure," "location," and "establishment" in-
terchangeably).
141 See, for example, Commissioner v Soliman, 506 US 168, 174 (1993) (confirming
common sense definition of "principal" with Webster's definition and holding that a doctor's
home office was not his "principal place of business" for tax purposes). For a general dis-
cussion, see Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory thterpretation, 107 Harv L
Rev 1437 (1994) (discussing the recent popularity of dictionary references in Supreme
Court opinions).
'46 Philip Babcock Grove, ed, Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the Eng-
lish Language, Unabridged 1727 (Merriam-Webster 1986).
14 See id.
148 See, for example, Welsh, 993 F2d at 1269 (recognizing a physical location require-
ment for Title II); Ford, 145 F3d at 612-13 (the same for the ADA).
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According to Webster's, "physical" means "of or belonging to all
created existences in nature," or "of or relating to natural or ma-
terial things as opposed to things mental, moral, spiritual and
imaginary.' 49 The internet is not part of those things clearly ex-
cluded by the definition of the term "physical," but neither is it
clearly within the definition. The best conclusion one can draw,
interpreting the language's plain meaning, is that Title II does
not automatically exclude the internet as a place of public ac-
commodation.
B. Legislative History and the Purposes of Title II
When the text of a statute is unclear, courts look to legisla-
tive history to interpret the statute's meaning.' The legislative
history behind Title II suggests that the internet is the kind of
"location" in which Congress intended Title II to prevent dis-
crimination. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in an era when
segregation, discrimination, and the demonstrations against
these practices undermined public life in the United States.'1
Legislating in this context, Congress intended Title II, the public
accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act, to end dis-
crimination in public accommodations affecting interstate com-
merce.
Title II contains an important qualifier: only entities that
"affect commerce" are public accommodations. The stated pur-
149 Grove, ed, Webster's Dictionary at 1706 (cited in note 146).
150 See Garcia v United States, 469 US 70, 74 (1984) (examining legislative history to
hold that statute prohibiting theft of mail money included prohibition of theft of money
undercover agent was using to purchase counterfeit bills from defendant).161 To Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate Com-
merce, S Rep No 872, 88th Cong, 2d Sess 11 (1964), reprinted in 1964 USCCAN 2365
("[The pattern of race relations that has developed in recent months-boycotts and coun-
terboycotts, economic relations, demonstrations-must be terminated. Of equal certainty
is the fact that the systematic denials of service directed at certain of our citizens in facili-
ties otherwise available to the public are a powerful force behind this unrest."). For a
general discussion, see Robert D. Loevy, ed, The Civil Rights Act of 1964: The Passage of
the Law that Ended Racial Segregation (SUNY 1997) (discussing the social background
behind the passage of the Civil Rights Act).
152 S Rep No 88-872 (cited in note 151) ("To Eliminate Discrimination in Public Ac-
commodations Affecting Interstate Commerce").
153 See 42 USC § 2000a(b). In addition, enumerated entities where state action sup-
ports discrimination are also public accommodations, see id, but since no state govern-
ment now allows segregation or discrimination, this provision is irrelevant. For purposes
of legislative history, discrimination by state actors represents another separate purpose
of Title II. The Supreme Court upheld Title II in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc v United
States, 379 US 241, 256 (1964) ("[Tlhe authority of Congress to keep the channels of inter-
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pose of Title II was to end discrimination in the listed locations as
it affected interstate commerce. Dean Griswold, appearing be-
fore the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, explained the con-
nection between the Commerce Clause and discrimination:
Public establishments presently discriminating... are en-
joying the benefits of access to a participation in com-
merce. The business of such establishments is fostered
and made more profitable because of the advantages af-
forded them by utilizing these various channels of com-
merce. However, when the discriminatory practices em-
ployed by such establishments lead to demonstrations or
boycotts in addition to the humiliation of those subject to
discrimination, the economy of our Nation suffers. 5
African Americans traveling from state to state, particularly in
the South, had limited options of where they could eat and sleep,
a simple example of how discrimination hurt interstate com-
merce."5 " Discrimination also affected the larger interstate econ-
omy because it discouraged industry from moving to the South,
state commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and
is no longer open to question.").
164 Civil Rights Act of 1963, HR Rep No 914, 88th Cong, 1st Sess 21 (1963), reprinted
in 1964 USSCAN 2494 ("Section 201(d) [of the proposed Civil Rights Act] precludes racial
discrimination or segregation among the same categories of business as those covered by
the Commerce Clause."). A brief summary of the history of public accommodations legisla-
tion suggests why this is significant. See generally Serena J. Hoy, Interpreting Equal
Protection: Congress, the Court, and the Civil Rights Act, 16 J L & Pol 381 (2000). Hoy
contends that "[i]n passing the Civil Rights Act, Congress was translating the Equal Pro-
tection Clause into the context of 1960's America." Id at 396. In 1875, soon after the pas-
sage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed a Civil Rights Act with a more ex-
pansive public accommodation provision than Title II. Civil Rights Act of 1875 § 1, dis-
cussed in Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3, 9 (1883) (including "inns," "public conveyances,"
and "other places of public amusement" as public accommodations). The monumental Civil
Rights Cases invalidated that Act as an overreach of the Fourteenth Amendment since it
attempted to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to non-state actors. See id at 13. Hoy
contends that, because Civil Rights Cases prevented Congress in 1963 from enacting Title
II pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress couched Title II as a Commerce
Clause provision when in fact senators supporting the bill believed they were reviving the
previous Civil Rights Act. See Hoy, 16 J L & Pol at 402. As evidence, Hoy points to the
frequent mention of the Equal Protection Clause and Reconstruction in committee reports
and in the comments of individual Congressmen. See, for example, HR 88-914 at 8, re-
printed in 1964 USCCAN at 2494 ("Congress has the constitutional right to eliminate
segregation or discrimination in places of public accommodation under the 14th Amend-
ment."). Hoy's argument does not provide direct support for a broad interpretation of Title
II, but it suggests that courts should be wary of narrowly interpreting Title II so as to
exclude from Title II entities the regulation of which serves these broader goals.
15 S Rep 88-872 at 17, reprinted in 1964 USCCAN at 2371 (cited in note 151).
166 See id at 18, reprinted in 1964 USCCAN at 2373.
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and encouraged skilled workers to relocate to avoid discrimina-
tory treatment.1'
An economic activity must "substantially affect" interstate
commerce to fall within the scope of Congress's power to regulate
commerce."' In American Libraries Association v Pataki,1 9 a dis-
trict court found without much analysis that the internet can fall
within the purview of the Commerce Clause.6° Applying Title II to
a particular web site or internet application would require dem-
onstrating that particular application substantially affected in-
terstate commerce, and this Comment does not attempt to define
that analysis. However, recognizing that the internet in general
has an impact on interstate commerce, and understanding that
the enacting Congress intended Title II to combat discrimination
affecting interstate commerce, suggests that applying Title II to
the internet would serve Title II's broad purpose of combating
discrimination.
Cutting against this interpretation is the obvious point that,
because the internet did not exist when Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the enacting Congress could not have specifi-
cally contemplated the internet as a locale in need of regulation
to prevent discrimination. 6 1 Congress likely enumerated hotels,
motels, and places of entertainment as public accommodations
because these were the key places in which this discrimination
157 See id.
158 See United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 560 (1995) (holding that the Commerce
Clause did not cover possession of a gun in a school zone because gun possession near a
school did not substantially affect interstate commerce). Chief Justice Rehnquist first
examined the history of the Commerce Clause in order to clarify the appropriate test, and
cites Heart of Atlanta as a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause. See id at 557.
159 969 F Supp 160 (S D NY 1997) (granting a preliminary injunction against the en-
forcement of a state law criminalizing the use of a computer to transfer obscene material
to a minor).
160 Id at 167. The court granted the injunction because the statute interfered with
Congress's right under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate commerce. See id at
169. This is an invocation of the "dormant Commerce Clause" which allows Congress to
prevent state regulations affecting interstate commerce from conflicting with one another
and interfering with interstate commerce. See id. For a critique of this use of the Com-
merce Clause in the internet context, see Jack L. Goldsmith and Alan 0. Sykes, The
Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 Yale L J 785, 786 (2001) (arguing the
dormant Commerce Clause does not require invalidation of state internet regulations).
161 Congress's stated purpose in enacting Title II was to "remove the daily affront and
humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the
general public." HR Rep No 88-914 at 18, reprinted in 1964 USCCAN at 2393 (cited in
note 138).
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occurred at the time, and were also focal points of interstate
travel.162
In spite of this argument, discrimination on the internet,
where found to substantially affect interstate commerce, seems
an equally large economic concern in today's economy as concerns
in the 1960s about interstate vehicle travel. Limiting public ac-
commodations to traditional places of entertainment rather than
all places of entertainment that implicate interstate commerce
does not serve the broad purposes of Title II, particularly now
when the internet is such a large part of interstate commerce and
appears to be gaining economic importance for the future." This
remains true even though some commentators are wary of ex-
panding the internet into existing regulatory structures.6 As the
American Libraries Association court noted: "While no one should
lose sight of the inventiveness [of the internet], the innovative-
ness of the technology does not preclude the application of tradi-
tional legal principles-provided that those principles are adapt-
able to cyberspace. "1"
Given the messy legislative history and the many private
deals required to ensure the Civil Rights Act's passage, it is im-
possible to know exactly what entities the enacting Congress
viewed as covered." Unfortunately, the legislative history does
not provide an explanation of the term "other places of exhibition
or entertainment," which would be of particular assistance in this
Comment's inquiry. Title I's legislative history, importantly,
does not preclude the inclusion of chat rooms and bulletin boards
as public accommodations.
162 These may also be the only accommodations on which Congress could agree; in
general, the passage of the Civil Rights Act involved careful compromises and tenuous
coalitions. See Charles and Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act 177-92 (Seven Locks Press 1985) (discussing the cautious nego-
tiations and concessions proponents of the Act made to gain the necessary votes to ensure
its passage).
1 See ACLU v Reno, 929 F Supp 824, 830-49 (E D Pa 1996), cited in Reno v ACLU,
521 US 844, 849-58 (1997) (discussing at length the large and increasing number of inter-
net users as well as the wide variety of information and communication services available
on the internet).
164 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U Chi Legal
F 207 (1996) ("Beliefs lawyers hold about computers, and predictions they make about new
technology are highly likely to be false. This should make us hesitate to prescribe legal
adaptations for cyberspace. The blind are not good trailblazers.").
165 American Libraries Association, 969 F Supp at 167.
166 See note 162 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE CASE FOR INCLUSION
The precedent behind Title II is disjointed, and the legisla-
tive intent underlying the statute is ambiguously broad. This
leaves several other possible tests and lines of analysis to deter-
mine whether Title II regulates interactive sites as public ac-
commodations. Under the broad Carparts framework of Mutual of
Omaha that ignores the physical/non-physical distinction be-
tween accommodations, 6' how one categorizes the internet or the
interactive site is irrelevant. A plaintiff only need prove that a
site operator has discriminatorily denied a service or a benefit in
a way that implicates interstate commerce." Applying the nar-
rower Parker or Welsh frameworks, however, plaintiffs only suc-
ceed if they demonstrate that the internet, and by extension the
internet spaces that interactive sites control, are physical
spaces."' This section addresses the Parker and Welsh require-
ment by examining the general conception of the internet, the
particular spaces interactive sites inhabit, and, finally, interac-
tive site bulletin boards and chat rooms as physical locations.
A. The Internet as a Physical Location
Courts face a choice when defining the internet from a loca-
tion standpoint: they can view the internet as a place, or consider
it a medium of communication, analogous to a telephone or a
television.76 Courts have adopted each definition. One can explain
this discrepancy, however, through an application-based classifi-
cation that distinguishes between internet uses, meaning that for
some applications the internet serves as a method of communica-
tion, and for other applications it serves as a place."' Commenta-
tors have argued extensively about the approach courts should
take to apply existing jurisdictional rules to internet activity.72
167 See Carparts, 37 F3d at 19.
's See Part III B 2.
169 See Parker, 121 F3d 1006, 1012-13 (discussed in Part II B 2 b); Welsh, 993 F2d at
1269 (discussed in Part I B 1).
170 See Jean Camp and Y. T. Chien, The Internet as Public Space: Concepts, Issues, and
Implications in Public Policy, 30 Computers and Socy 13, 13 (Sept 2000).
171 See Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 Va L Rev 1163, 1164
(1999) (arguing for separate classifications based on application, for example, treating e-
mail, telnet, and browsers separately).
171 See Asaad Siddiqui, Welcome to the City of Bytes? An Assessment of the Traditional
Methods Employed in the International Application of Jurisdiction over Internet Activi-
ties-Including a Critique of Suggested Approaches, 14 NY Intl L Rev 43, 96-98 (2001)
(summarizing the jurisdictional debate between commentators).
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This debate suggests that while the internet is clearly not the
same as a traditional physical space like a stadium or a theater,
it should be considered their equivalent for the purposes of regu-
lation.
1. Application-based classification.
Courts issuing opinions in internet-related cases have re-
ferred to the internet as both a place and as a form of media. In
Loving v Boren,' the district court denied the plaintiff's request
for an injunction prohibiting the University of Oklahoma from
blocking access to obscene material on its news server.' The
court described news groups as "interactive 'places' on the Inter-
net, into which anyone with access, anywhere in the world, may
place graphic or text messages.""' Reno v ACLU,176 which invali-
dated sections of the Communications Decency Act that prohib-
ited online child pornography,177 noted that "[clyberspace unde-
niably reflects some form of geography; chat rooms and Web sites,
for example, exist at 'fixed' locations on the Internet."17 Still, the
Reno court compared the internet with broadcast media in apply-
ing First Amendment standards to the problem of online pornog-
raphy. 9 The court in American Libraries Association also viewed
the internet as a "conduit" and found it "analogous to a highway
or railroad."'8 The district court determined that the transmission
of pornography through e-mail was a form of interstate com-
merce;.. the images transferred were "goods" moving in com-
merce, and the internet connections on which they traveled were
the conduit that transported them from state to state.'82
In their totality, these cases suggest that courts do not clas-
sify the internet entirely as either a place or a form of media."
Unlike other kinds of media, like the telephone or television, the
internet is a generic space that hosts a wide variety of materials
173 956 F Supp 953 (W D Okla 1997).
174 Id at 954.
175 Id.
176 521 US 844 (1997).
177 See id at 882 (basing their decision on the fact that the provisions were content-
based and were facially overbroad).
178 Id at 890.
179 See id at 869-70 (applying standards set forth in cases governing FCC 'regulations,
and specially calling the internet a "medium").
180 969 F Supp at 161, 173.
181 See id at 167.
18 See id at 173.
1'8 See also Wu, 85 Va L Rev at 1164 (cited in note 171).
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and applications. 4 The internet is also a network that stores and
transfers information for a variety of uses.n Some applications,
such as e-mail, bear a strong resemblance to traditional media
devices like the telephone. Others, like chat rooms and web sites,
have a different function and deserve separate consideration.
2. Jurisdiction-derived arguments that the internet is a
"place": servers and networks.
In the field of personal jurisdiction over internet operators, at
least one court has taken the media view of the internet with re-
spect to web-based commerce. 8 ' This inquiry is analytically dis-
tinguishable, however, from the "place" inquiry Title II requires.
To determine personal jurisdiction where a party is absent from
the forum state, courts must determine if that party had mini-
mum contacts with the forum state.'87 In the internet context,
courts examine the level of contact the party created with the fo-
rum state through the specific internet application." Jurisdic-
tional rules do not address the question of whether the internet is
a location; for jurisdictional purposes, the judicial inquiry focuses
on how that internet activity, regardless of whether it took place
in an electronic "location," affected an existing geographic juris-
diction.'" Thus, the internet can be a medium of contacting the
forum state for, purposes of jurisdiction, but also a location for
other purposes.
Scholarship addressing jurisdictional problems relating to
the internet provides strong arguments for classifying internet
applications as more than a medium of communication. ' First,
1 See Camp and Chien, 30 Computers & Socy at 14 (cited in note 170) ("The Internet
is more like physical spaces in that the same generic technology defines things, which are
very different-different spaces, locales, media or forums.").
" See Wu, 85 Va L Rev at 1193 (cited in note 171) (noting that the "end-to-end" design
of the internet allows applications to determine function, ensuring flexibility for the sys-
tem as a whole).
"6 See Zippo Manufacturing Co v Zippo Dot Corn, Inc, 952 F Supp 1119, 1123-24 (W
D Pa 1997) (finding personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania where a web site operator solic-
ited business over the internet with residents of Pennsylvania).
187 International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945) (finding minimum
contacts existed where a corporation did limited business in the state).
18' See, for example, Zippo, 952 F Supp at 1123-24. See generally Christopher Paul
Boam, The Internet, Information, and the Culture of Regulatory Change: A Modern Ren-
aissance, 9 CommLaw Conspectus 175, 191-200 (2001).
189 See Zippo, 952 F Supp at 1123-24.
190 See Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet,
38 San Diego L Rev 817, 822-23 (2001) (arguing for the internet as a separate place);
Andrew L. Shapiro, The Disappearance of Cyberspace and the Rise of Code, 8 Seton Hall
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information accessible through the internet exists in traditional
physical space-on a site operator's servers. David Johnson and
David Post ascribe a "placeness" to the internet because of this
structure; servers store information, giving it permanence, and
allow many people to access it at the same time, making it
shared.'
Other commentators apply Johnson and Post's idea but ex-
plain it differently. " Asaad Siddiqui characterizes the internet as
a connected network with a central storage location; it is univer-
sal in that no one single person controls it. 93 Alexander Tsesis
argues that the internet is a "real space" because it has character-
istics of "space-time."9 4 Applying Tsesis' argument, while two us-
ers accessing the same information through a web site are them-
selves in different physical locations, and the information they
access is in yet another location on a server, a space exists where
both the two users and the information are located. 9' That space
is "real because [it is] public, accessible to all who have the neces-
sary computer hardware and software, exist[s] at [a] specific time
after which [the information] can be retained or deleted, and
originate[s] from sources with individual internet addresses.""
A server that stores information accessible through the
internet is not the only physical location through which internet
activity takes place. The internet is a network of computers and
servers, both those of the user and those of the site operator, as
well as the conduits that transmit data between the two.'97 This
aggregation of servers, computers, and users fortifies the place
argument by creating a larger physical zone of interaction. As-
cribing "placeness" to the internet implies that individual web
sites on the internet can be thought of as locations within that
physical space.
Const L J 703, 704 (1998) (arguing against the internet as a place); David R. Johnson and
David Post, Law and Borders-the Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan L Rev 1367, 1378-
79 (1996) (proposing, for the first time, the consideration of the internet as a separate
place).
191 See Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1378-79 (cited in note 190) (arguing that
because information exists in different existing jurisdictions, the internet should have its
own jurisdiction).
192 Tsesis, 38 San Diego L Rev at 822-23 (cited in note 190).
'9' See Siddiqui, 14 N Y Intl L Rev at 49 (cited in note 172).
194 See Tsesis, 38 San Diego L Rev at 822-23 (cited in note 190).
19' See id.
"' Id.
1 See Siddiqui, 14 N Y Intl L Rev at 52 (cited in note 172) (listing potential locations
from which to determine jurisdictional location).
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Not all scholars agree with Johnson and Post that the inter-
net has "placeness," but their disagreement stems from their be-
lief that existing bodies of law should govern internet activity
rather than creating new legal regimes. That is, they do not ac-
cept the view that new legal regimes are needed to resolve poten-
tial jurisdictional conflicts."" In the case of Title II, applying exist-
ing law to internet activity seems to require rather than discour-
age the perception of "placeness." In order to regulate discrimina-
tion through Title II, that discrimination must occur somewhere
other than the offices or homes of internet users. This makes the
Title II context unique. Internet-based intellectual property regu-
lation, for example, does not require the concept of placeness.'"
Because certain internet applications have elements of placeness,
in addition to meeting the other requirements of Title II, even a
narrow conception of Title II should regulate them.
B. Interactive Sites As Membership Organizations
Categorizing the internet as a place satisfies the Parker test
for interactive sites as public accommodations under the ADA.2,0
The Welsh Title II analysis, however, may require interactive
sites to meet additional criteria.' °1 Popular interactive sites like
AOL, Yahoo! ("Yahoo"), and the Microsoft Network ("MSN") re-
quire people to register or "sign up" to access their services. This
registration process is arguably a membership application proc-
ess. If so, these interactive sites only fall under Title II's purview
when (1) they are "affiliated with a place open to the public" and
(2) "membership in the organization is a necessary predicate to
the use of the facility."2 "3 Put another way, membership organiza-
198 See Shapiro, 8 Seton Hall Const L J at 704 (cited in note 190) ("[Tlhis conception [of
the internet as place] wrongly implies that online interactions are, or should be, governed
by their own body of law."). See also Easterbrook, 1996 U Chi Legal F at 207 (cited in note
165) (arguing that traditional property principles should apply to intellectual property on
the internet).
199 See Scott W. Campbell, Securities Law & Internet: Doing Business in a Rapidly
Changing Marketplace: Chat Rooms and Related Issues, 1046 PLI/Corp 785, 788 (1998)
(noting that the NASD "views chat rooms as interactive, extemporaneous public forums
and subject to securities laws").
200 Again, assuming that the site operator's activities affect interstate commerce. See
Parker, 121 F3d at 1012-13.
'o' See Welsh, 493 F2d at 1269.
202 See <http://www.aol.com>; <http://www.yahoo.com>; <http://www.msn.com> (all
visited Nov 15, 2002) [all on file with U Chi Legal F].
203 See Clegg, 18 F3d at 756.
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tions are only public accommodations "when the organization
functions as a 'ticket' to admission to a facility or location."'
To access their web site, most site operators require visitors
to enter a username and password.' °° Membership is therefore a
predicate to entrance into the facility, so these interactive sites
will almost always meet the second requirement. As long as the
internet qualifies as a "place" for Title II purposes, the only re-
maining inquiry is whether the sites are open to the public,
meaning universal eligibility to register and access the site. Pri-
vate web sites, in contrast, screen those eligible to register and
enter. Welsh provides seven factors to determine whether an or-
ganization is private rather than public."'6 These factors include:
(1) the organization's selectivity; (2) membership's control of the
organization's operations; (3) the organization's history; (4) the
use of facilities by nonmembers; (5) the organization's purpose;
(6) whether the organization advertises for members; and (7)
whether the organization is nonprofit or for profit. 7
Of these factors, the most important is the organization's se-
lectivity0 The online registration processes of Yahoo, MSN, and
AOL allow anyone to sign up to enter their web sites and receive
their services."9 Parts of AOL's web site are accessible only to
paying customers, but this service is still available to anyone.""
Registrants do not control these organizations.1 ' None of these
interactive sites have changed their membership requirements
since their inception, a traditional indication that they remain
public for the purposes of Title II.212 The purposes of these types of
204 Welsh, 993 F2d at 1272, citing United States Jaycees v Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination, 463 NE2d 1151, 1159 (Mass 1984).
20 See, for example, <http://chat.yahoo.com/> (visited Nov 17, 2002); <http:l!
www.aol.com> (visited Nov 17, 2002); <http:/Ilogin.passport.com> (portal to MSN web site)
(visited Nov 15, 2002) [all on file with U Chi Legal F].
206 Welsh, 993 F2d at 1276, citing United States v Landsdowne Swim Club, 713 F Supp
785, 796-97 (E D Pa 1989).
207 See Welsh, 993 F2d at 1276.
201 See id (discussing Tillman v Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc, 410 US
431, 438 (1973), which held that a swimming pool association that essentially allowed
every white person within a certain geographic area to join was not a "private club" and
therefore was subject to Title II regulation).
209 See, for example, <http://edit.yahoo.com> (visited Nov 17, 2001); <http:l/register.
passport.com> (the sign-on portal to MSN) (visited Nov 17, 2001); <http://www.aol.com>
(visited Nov 15, 2002) [all on file with U Chi Legal Fl.
210 See AOL's pricing plans, available online at <http://www.aol.com/info/pricing.html>
(visited Nov 15, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
21' The membership of private clubs tend to control the club operations.
212 This requirement seems to protect against sham private organizations, such as
organizations that at one time were non-exclusive but abruptly changed to avoid the anti-
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interactive sites seem to be to provide access to information and
interaction opportunities for a wide group of internet users, a
purpose that seems public in nature. Each of these interactive
sites advertises for members. Finally, all of these services are
for-profit."
Since all the above factors, including the most important fac-
211tor of selectivity, suggest that these interactive sites are public,
interactive sites with these characteristics would have difficulty
maintaining the argument that they are private organizations.
Consequently, these interactive sites could be public accommoda-
tions, insofar that they constitute "places of exhibition or enter-
tainment" under Title II.
C. Categorizing Bulletin Boards and Chat Rooms
After resolving the membership issue, the final question re-
mains whether internet bulletin boards and chat rooms are
"places of exhibition and entertainment" under Title II. An analy-
sis of existing precedent suggests that many bulletin boards and
chat rooms meet this requirement.
1. Participatory and spectator entertainment.
The Supreme Court has held that a public accommodation
falls within the exhibition and entertainment category of public
accommodations if it "customarily presents films, performances,
athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment
which move in commerce.'"' The specific "places of exhibition and
entertainment" listed in Title II-motion picture houses, concert
halls, theaters, sports arenas, and stadiums-are all places of
performances that accommodate the public as spectators. Under
the doctrine of ejusdem generis, because the specific places listed
are all places associated with spectator entertainment, the gen-
discrimination provisions of Title II. See, for example, Tillman, 410 US at 434 (noting that
the pool association abruptly changed its guest policy when a member tried to bring an
African-American friend as a guest).
213 All three interactive sites currently advertise on television for members.
214 AOL is a division of Time-Warner, a for-profit corporation; MSN is owned by Micro-
soft, also for profit; and Yahoo, independently owned, is also for profit. See Yahoo's inves-
tor relations portal, available online at <http://docs.yahoo.com/info/investor.html> (visited
Nov 15, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
211 See Welsh, 993 F2d at 1276.
216 Daniel v Paul, 395 US 298, 303 (1969) (holding that a recreational facility with
swimming, boating, and miniature golf constituted a place of entertainment under Title
I).
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eral term "places of entertainment" must be restricted to places of
spectator entertainment.17
Despite this possible narrower interpretation of the types of
places of entertainment Title II might cover, courts have had a
broader vision of the statute. Participatory entertainment is still
covered under this language. The Supreme Court in Daniel v
Paul,21 ' in holding that a recreational facility with swimming,
boating, and miniature golf was a place of entertainment, specifi-
cally rejected the argument that places of entertainment must be
places of spectator, rather than participatory, entertainment. 9
2. Avoiding the "social relationships" designation.
This expansion is crucial for internet chat rooms and bulletin
boards since these fora are almost entirely participatory. How-
ever, this designation makes activity that occurs in internet fora
more like mere "social relationships," which the Welsh court was
careful to exclude as places of public accommodation."' In dicta,
the Daniel Court adopted a broad notion of "places of entertain-
ment" as locations that "caus[e] someone's time to pass agreea-
bly.' This definition is broad almost to the point of being nonde-
scriptive, but it does indicate that courts should interpret "places
of exhibition and entertainment" more broadly than the types of
places specifically mentioned in Title II.
One can analogize chat rooms and bulletin boards to tradi-
tional physical settings where people meet to mingle with one
another, places like bars, restaurants, dance clubs, and coffee
houses. Courts have held bars to be public accommodations under
Title II, either under the restaurant classification where they
serve a significant amount of food,2 or as places of entertain-
ment, particularly where they contain specific sources of enter-
tainment like a jukebox or a shuffleboard table.222 This same rea-
217 Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation at 823 (cited in note 17).
218 395 US 298 (1969).
219 See id at 306.
220 See Welsh, 993 F2d at 1275.
221 Daniel, 395 US at 306 n 7.
222 Consider Cuevas v Sdrales, 344 F2d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir 1965) (discussing classifi-
cation of bars under the Act and finding that a bar that served only alcohol was not a
public accommodation under the Act).
222 See United States v DeRosier, 473 F2d 749, 751-52 (5th Cir 1973) (holding that a
"neighborhood bar" with "mechanical amusement devices" was a place of entertainment
under Title II).
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soning would include dance clubs or coffee houses under Title II if
they included musical mechanical entertainment devices."4
This line of cases also suggest a liberal definition of "place of
exhibition Qr entertainment," but that definition may still exclude
internet chat rooms and bulletin boards. Whether a facility is de-
termined to be a place of exhibition of entertainment seems to
turn on the presence of specific devices or items that entertain
patrons, rather than the accommodation as an opportunity for
patrons to interact through conversation alone. In United States v
Baird," for example, the court held a convenience store to be a
place of entertainment under Title II solely because the store
housed two video game machines. 6 Defending this holding, the
court noted that the games have a decisive impact on the use of
the space because "[people are less likely to stay in a store and
talk to each other, if there is nothing to do there but buy conven-
ience food and sundries, than if there are games to play."27
Internet chat rooms and bulletin boards allow users to com-
municate in particular environments that are places of enter-
tainment. Some interactive sites allow users to express their
thoughts using stylized script, or to express their feelings using
special icons that indicate emotion.2" These innovations may
make the interactive site different from a physical structure that
merely offers people a physical space in which to communicate.
Still, Baird suggests that the interactive sites that stand the best
chance of categorization as places of entertainment are those that
combine chat rooms or bulletin boards with specific entertain-
ment options, such as those allowing users to play online games
and chat with their opponents at the same time.2" As technology
improves, internet chat rooms and bulletin boards will likely be-
come more interactive, contain more specialized elements for par-
'2' See id.
225 85 F3d 450 (9th Cir 1996).
226 See id at 453.
227 Id.
Many chatroom users, for example, use "emoticons," or special icons that users can
display to one another to supplement their typewritten conversations. A list and explana-
tion of common emoticons is available online at <http://www.pb.org/emoticon.html> (vis-
ited Nov 15, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
229 <httpJ/www.games.com> (visited Nov 15, 2002) is one free interactive site that
provides these services to registered users. Numerous gaming web sites also provide chat
opportunities. See <http://www.diamondclubcasino.com/help/?.doc=HELPPLAY> (visited
Nov 15, 2002) (explaining how to use the website's multiple player and chat functions);
<http://www.riverboatcasino.com/help/?doc=HELPPLAY> (visited Nov 15, 2002) (same);
<http/www.minivegas.com/help/?doc=HELPPLAY> (visited Nov 15, 2002) (same) [all on
file with U Chi Legal F]. Other gambling or game sites likely provide similar services.
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ticipants to use in interacting with one another, and, in short,
may become more entertaining.
CONCLUSION
In seeking to make a claim under Title II against a site op-
erator, plaintiffs like Mr. Noah face an uphill battle."° First, such
plaintiffs must argue that their interactive sites are locations
rather than services or media. Second, they must demonstrate
that the interactive site is a public rather than a private entity.
Third, they must prove that their interactive site is a "place of
entertainment" under Title II.
The decision to expand Title II to cover interactive sites
would mean viewing the purposes of Title II broadly in light of its
legislative history. A court must either disregard Welsh's applica-
tion in the internet context, or accept the concept of the internet
as the equivalent of physical space for purposes of Title II. A
court also must maintain an open view of the way in which chat
rooms and bulletin boards entertain their users. Title II prece-
dent and the statute's plain meaning and legislative history sup-
port these conclusions, but an adoption of this view is not imme-
diately obvious. Still, to the extent that interactive sites discrimi-
nate against users in internet spaces that are Title II public ac-
commodations, courts should allow Title II claims to combat such
discrimination.
2" It should also be noted that Mr. Noah is not the typical plaintiff, and has a more
difficult case to make than another plaintiff who had, for example, been denied access to a
chat room altogether because of her religion. Factually, demonstrating discrimination in
access seems easier to prove than the disparate monitoring claim Noah brings; he claims
that the behavior of other users, and subsequently AOL's failure to regulate their behav-
ior, denied him equal enjoyment of AOL's public accommodation. See Complaint, Noah v
AOL Time Warner, Inc, Civil Action No. 01-1342-A at *36. Courts may not be sympathetic
to these kinds of claims where the underlying discrimination is an site operator's failure to
filter out objectionable content. Consider Evans v Harry's Hardware, Inc, 2001 WL
1190987 (E D La). In Evans, a customer of a hardware store allegedly shouted racial epi-
thets and threats at another customer, and the manager failed to intervene. See id at *1.
In addition to dismissing the plaintiff's claim because hardware stores are not covered
under Title II, the court expressed skepticism that the owner's conduct constituted "denial
of full and equal enjoyment of the subject hardware store's goods and services." Id at *3.
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